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Abstract 
Negotiation is a process based on strategic choices. Each participant must fix carefully its objectives and decide what are the 
most appropriate ways and means in order to attain those. The choice of a strategy can be influenced by many factors like the 
concern for the other party's outcome or even the context but as seen in a previous article, strategic issues are mostly based on 
three essential driving forces: the negotiator's power, the level of trust and the nature or level of stakes. In this paper our intention 
is to clarify the aspects and elements of the relationship between the determinants of a strategic choice within a limited number of 
options in a specific negotiation and the usual driving forces. This should allow uncovering new hypotheses for experimental 
research. 
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1. Introduction 
Negotiation is a complex activity involving participants with different goals, interests and resources and a certain 
level of interdependency regarding an outcome that will produce an expected gain or effect. 
One of the strategic aspects is the presence of both competition and cooperation. As shown by Lax and Sebenius 
(1986), any negotiation includes both "value creating" and "value claiming" features but these two dimensions 
cannot be expressed simultaneously. Negotiators must take care of their own interests but also have to consider their 
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counterpart interests in order to find an agreement. The difficulty is in fixing objectives with certain flexibility and 
deciding on the best possible strategy in order to succeed.   
What are the factors taken into account by negotiators when fixing a strategy? Some of the fundamental elements 
of any negotiation can be considered as the most important driving forces: Power, trust and stakes will generally 
determine the usual strategic orientations while as we will see the combination of these factors can create dilemmas 
in the strategic choices. In a previous paper (Alavoine, 2012) using observations from a negotiation simulation these 
driving forces were associated to the classic strategic choices of Pruitt dual concern model (1983) and also 
Cathelineau (1991).  Recently, the introduction of the strategic choices exposed by Dupont (1996) to participants of 
the same simulation has raised many questions on the estimation of these options and the relationship with the usual 
driving forces of negotiation. While most of the possible strategic combinations presented by Dupont (1996) should 
reflect a clear positioning towards the balance of power, the level of trust and the nature of stakes, some choices are 
sometimes far from being rational. Our intention in this paper is to present some of the aspects of this second wave 
of experiments in order to discuss new paths for further research. 
2. Power, stakes and trust as driving forces  
2.1. Asymmetry of power  
Power as a concept has interested searchers in many different disciplines with a huge variety of thoughts and can 
be defined in many ways. A classic definition comes from Weber (1947) who defines power as a probability for an 
actor to be in a position to carry out his will despite resistance. Many conceptions of power in social relations were 
later built on this vision.  
From all the theories of power, one of the most frequently used and referenced model of social power is the one 
from French and Raven (1959). They were the first to identify and introduce five different bases of power that a 
person can exert over another one: Reward power refers to the capacity to provide others with things they desire or 
value, Coercive power which consists of the capacity to force someone to do something and to administer sanctions, 
punishments or even to take away advantages, Legitimate power refers to the capacity to impose a sense of 
obligation due to a role, a status, Expert power is based on knowledge and skills and is the capacity to provide 
another with needed or expected information, Referent power is the ability to provide others with feelings of 
acceptance, approval, based on their desire of identification, their admiration, their attraction to your traits, 
characteristics and qualities 
Raven, later on, suggested that "Informational" power should be detached from "Expert" power, distinguishing 
therefore a sixth type of power (Raven, 1965). To Raven, the capacity to formulate a rational explanation about the 
necessity to comply or submit to a decision gives a power that can be considered either direct or indirect depending 
on its formulation. It is related to a form of persuasion and a capacity to convince with the appropriate arguments. 
Negotiation is a situation involving participants with different resources and a diverse power or influence 
regarding the outcome and the distribution of these resources. Because power is inequitably and irregularly 
dispersed, the negotiators face a balance of power (or an unbalanced power) that reveals and changes during the 
negotiation process. This balance will evolve depending on the arguments, possible solutions but also the types and 
sources of power that are used. Some might have short or lasting effects, light or strong influence. One way of 
regarding power in negotiation is usually to consider the ways and means enabling to punish or reward your 
counterpart. Therefore power mainly expresses itself through tactics of pressure. 
Fischer and Ury (1981) with the concept of "best alternative to a negotiated agreement" (BATNA) showed that 
the strength of a negotiator depends on the number and value of alternatives at his disposal. A way of evaluating an 
agreement is the best possible alternative. If the outcome is under this value there is no point in accepting it. But this 
power relies similarly on the number and value of your counterpart options.  
To Bacharach and Lawler (1981), the level of dependency towards your counterpart will determine your strength 
or weakness in negotiation. They consider two different aspects: the existence and potential of alternatives but also 
the importance of interests, stakes, objectives or expectations. Participants have different anticipations regarding the 
interests provided by the resources that they want to exchange. 
Wolfe and McGinn (2005) consider that power must not be measured in terms of alternatives but much more as a 
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relational construct in which each participant perception of the balance of power has an influence over the 
integrativeness of the agreement.  
Lewicki & al (2001) assume that power in negotiation must not be considered as absolute and coercive even if it 
is mostly a capacity to influence or the ability to bring about outcomes that are desired. They prefer to separate the 
power revealed in negotiations from the influence processes used in interpersonal relations. 
In that sense they join the relational definition of power given by Deutsch (1973) that emphasises the specificities 
of each situation. The power of an actor in a given situation (contingency approach) can be evaluated as the "degree 
that he can satisfy the purposes that he is attempting to fulfil". Therefore power depends also on the relationship 
rather than purely on the resources of each participant. According to Deutsch (1973), some elements of power derive 
from the situation or the context instead of being only attributes of each actor.  
According to Dupont (1996) the sources of power can be classified in two categories: those associated to the 
situation like latitude of choice or time and those related to the negotiator himself like skills, expertise, charisma or 
credibility. Baldwin & al (2009) show that possessing information about your counterpart can increase the feeling of 
interpersonal power leading to a more active role in the process and different expectations regarding one’s partner. 
Boulding (1999), considering that power is the ability to get what we want, divides it in three major categories 
from the point of view of its consequences: destructive power, productive power and integrative power. The last one 
has a destructive and productive aspect depending on the relationship and its origin. 
Finally, according to Kim & al (2005), power can be divided in four components: 
x Potential power which can be defined as the underlying capacity of negotiators to obtain benefits from their 
agreement. 
x Perceived power which can be considered as a negotiator’s assessment of his counterpart potential power in the 
relationship. 
x Realized power which refers to the extent to which negotiators claim benefits from their interaction 
x Power tactics which are basically the negotiators ’efforts to change the balance of power in the relationship 
Altogether these elements create an integrative model which emphasizes the dynamic nature of power relations 
before and within the negotiation process. 
2.2. Interests and stakes 
Interests can be constituted of tangible but also intangible traits. Participants have different expectations and 
evaluation regarding the interests provided by the agreement which depends mainly on the nature and quantity of 
resources that they put in the negotiation process.  
For Lax and Sebenius (1986) there is a clear difference between “Intrinsic” and “Instrumental” interests. While 
the first ones are independent of any following deals and are directly related to the object of a specific negotiation, 
the second ones are important for the success of subsequent deals. Intrinsic interests are objective, measurable, 
unemotional and deliver their effects on a short term basis while the other ones are more long-term oriented and can 
be totally personal and subjective.  
Leroux (1992) divides between “Instrumental” and “Fundamental” stakes. 
To Leroux, the visible, material, tangible part (Instrumental) constituted mostly of economic aspects is less 
important and influential in the decision making process than the invisible one (Fundamental) which refers to 
notions like self-esteem, status or reputation. The impact of this subjective dimension of stakes is unfortunately 
unconscious while a determining factor in a negotiator’s decision. 
As Dupont (1996) shows, there is a clear link between interests and stakes. Every negotiation implies objectives 
with interests, expectations, risks, therefore consequences. What is at stake in negotiation is the impact of the result 
on the tangible but also intangible interests. No wonder whether these elements will influence each negotiator 
strategy by adding to the pressure of finding an agreement but also depending on the very nature of what is at stake 
will change the balance of power and the level of trust between participants. 
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2.3. Trust 
As demonstrated by Olekalns & al (2007) there is a clear link between trust and outcomes in negotiation. To 
them trust is relative to the context and the other party but also related to the level of power of the participants. 
Trust is founded on vulnerability and also expectations. You expect that your counterpart will act in a proper way 
without control and guarantee and that it will serve your interests and expectations. It leads you to bet on the basis of 
someone else (potential) comportment. Trust is "a psychological state comprising the intention to accept 
vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behaviours of another" (Rousseau & al, 1998). 
Therefore risk and interdependence are two essential elements of it.  
To Lewicki & al (1998) trust is a set of “confident positive expectations regarding another’s conduct” so the idea 
of distrust brings “negative expectations”. Trust and distrust according to them are separate dimensions. Low 
distrust and high trust could not compare.  
For Turel and Yuan (2008), trust can be considered as a personality trait or as a state due to the situation or the 
context. In the first case, a predisposition to trust others should lead to different approaches and strategies than those 
of distrustful individuals. In the second case, trust is a momentary state of mind leading a negotiator to a specific 
action. 
To Rousseau & al (1998), trust can be considered in three different ways: as an independent variable (cause), a 
dependent variable (effect), or an interaction variable (condition). Building a trustfully relationship in negotiation is 
not only necessary in order to find a settlement but also it is one of the most difficult task depending on each 
participant’ perception (cause, effect or condition), objectives and power.  
2.4.  Strategy models 
One of the first strategic choice model, the “dual concern model” (Pruitt, 1983) displays four options from 
“Contending” to “Problem Solving” through “Yielding” and even “Inaction” depending on two basic variables: the 
concern about your own income or about the other party's outcome. For Pruitt (1983), the problem solving approach 
implies a high level of concern for the other party's outcome but also a certain level of trust that will lead to 
cooperation during the process.  
For Cathelineau (1991), the two most important criteria in order to fix a strategy are the level of trust and strength 
(level of power). To illustrate, a defensive orientation is based on an unfavourable position in terms of power 
combined with a lack of trust in the other party. A favourable balance of power with the same lack of trust would 
lead to the use of a coercive strategy. As shown by Lytle & al (1999), interests (stakes), rights and power provide 
three different approaches and strategic alternatives to negotiation.  
They indicated that during the process participants organise their arguments mainly through these aspects and 
switch from one angle to another one with a clear tendency to use power and rights at the beginning of negotiation. 
They recommend focusing on interests more than rights and power which lead to a more distributive outcome and a 
more conflictual process.  
Dupont (1996) presents five main strategic orientations:  
x Competition or Cooperation Tendency 
x Offensive/Defensive 
x Short/Long (Time) 
x Imposition/Adaptation 
x Open/Restricted (Object) 
According to him, the first choice is impossible to avoid. But while negotiation is a mix of these two dimensions, 
it is impossible to use both at the same time and negotiators must decide which orientation they should start with. 
“Offensive” means that you take the initiatives and lead the discussions while “Defensive” refers to a “wait and 
see” style. “Imposition” or “Adaptation” relates to the “rules of the game” and the capacity to force your counterpart 
to follow your guidelines or on the opposite to adjust to your opponent’ directives. 
“Short” or “Long” refers to your willingness either to reduce or extend the process in time. 
Finally, “Open” or “Restricted” is linked to the negotiator’s latitude over the extension of the negotiation object 
or points to negotiate. Negotiators can decide to mix these orientations or on the opposite make a strict selection of 
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the most important aspect (including the inevitable competition/cooperation dilemma) depending on their objectives 
and situation regarding their counterpart. As explained by Dupont (1996), strategies are not always simple ones 
because they depend on many contingent factors and the evolution of the negotiation process.  
Experimentation and discussion 
Using a simulation derived from Brett “Cartoon” (2001) placing three groups of negotiators (two groups of 
sellers and a group of buyer) in a situation with both integrative and distributive potential and many possible 
variations in the balance of power (cf. Alavoine, 2012), our purpose was to explore the conditions in which the 
participants fix their objectives and strategies. The options presented by Dupont (1996) were presented together with 
different combinations of levels of power, trust (based on previous experiments) and different objectives (stakes) 
leading to a better understanding of the determining factors of a strategic choice. 
2.5. Rational choices? 
The first choice asked to the participants was regarding the usual integrative and distributive dimensions of any 
negotiation. Most of the participants involved considered that when your balance of power is favorable or your level 
of power high, the first and most appropriate choice in respect to Dupont’s list of strategic choices is competition 
more than cooperation. Power becomes a tool in order to force your counterpart to accept your priorities. On the 
opposite, cooperation becomes the only option when the level of power is low confirming subsequently the previous 
position. Competition would quickly reveal your lack of power while cooperation could be justified in many other 
ways. 
But it becomes complicated when trust is taken into consideration as displayed in the following table:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Why competition if your level of trust is high even if you have a favorable balance of power? 
To most of the participants, power was used in order to find integrative solutions and cooperation seemed to be 
the proper way for strengthening a trustfully relationship. But cooperation could be interpreted as manipulation in 
front of a negotiator with an unfavorable balance of power leading to a decrease in the level of trust.  
Why cooperation if your level of trust is low together with a low level of power? 
This situation created a dilemma. While a low level of power implies cooperation, a low level of trust refrains 
from this choice and a competitive orientation seems difficult to apply in a front of someone more powerful. 
Other factors like stakes or interests have to be considered in order to decide but the decision turns out to be even 
more complicated if stakes are taken into account: 
A high level of stakes is considered as a determining factor for competition while a low level of stakes is driving 
participants to cooperate with no risk. As shown in Table 2, a high level of stakes leads participants to either 
competition or cooperation depending on their level of power. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. First strategic choice depending on Power and Trust 
  Trust 
  High Low 
Power 
High 
Competition / 
Cooperation? 
Competition 
Low Cooperation ? 
Table 2. First strategic choice depending on Power and Stakes 
  Stakes 
  High Low 
Power 
High Competition Cooperation 
Low Cooperation ? 
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A situation with low stakes and low power creates an indecisive position with doubts regarding the capacity and 
necessity to negotiate. On the same level a situation with no trust and a low level of stakes or interests even with a 
high level of power questions the nature of the negotiation that is going to take place.  
When stakes and power are high, participants choose a competitive approach unless a high level of trust drives 
them to cooperation. A high level of stakes together with trust but a low level of power force participants to 
cooperation.  
As a result there are some "rational" choices as displayed in Table 3: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
But also some difficult choices as displayed below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If negotiation is considered as an opportunistic situation, a high level of power together with trust but with no 
interests (and no risks) could lead you to cooperate in order to let stakes and interests emerge from the situation 
during the process. In that sense cooperation seems to be the most appropriate choice if the intention is not to profit 
from the circumstances and get most of the gains in a very distributive way. 
When the risk is high with many stakes but with no power and a low level of trust, is competition (bluffing) the 
best way or would it be better to reveal your position and expect that your counterpart will be empathetic?  
Some choices seem to be also impossible to make: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strategic options are not limited to the two essential dimensions of any negotiation (competition or cooperation) 
as described by many authors. Combinations of strategic choices are even more difficult to define due to their level 
of compatibility. 
When the participants are questioned about the others options they usually consider the offensive and imposition 
approaches as linked to competition while adaptation often reflects a cooperative option; Defensive can be 
considered in both ways even if being defensive doesn’t reflects much a spirit of cooperation. To many participants 
Imposition reveals power, a lack of trust and probably a high level of stakes. 
Finally short or long orientations relate to power and trust while a long (process) orientation can reveal a lack of 
stakes and the willingness to use time in order to create new interests. The Open and Restricted options are 
essentially linked in the participants’ minds to the initial level of stakes and trust. 
Table 3. "Rational" choices 
Power Trust Stakes  
High Low High Competition 
High High High Cooperation 
Low High High Cooperation 
Table 4. Rational choices? 
Power Trust Stakes  
High High Low Cooperation? 
Low Low High Cooperation/Competition? 
Table 5. “Impossible” choices? 
Power Trust Stakes  
High Low Low Negotiation? 
Low High Low Negotiation? 
Low Low Low Negotiation? 
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2.6. Irrational choices? 
In the situation used for the experimentation, participants were facing strategic choices based on different levels 
of stakes and power but also trust depending on previous experiments leading to varied outcomes. The different 
options presented by Dupont (1996) were offered to them and a clear strategic plan had to be expressed before 
starting negotiating.   
Some combinations seemed obvious as displayed below but many question marks remain even in the most 
obvious choices.  
 
The first combination reflects a very favorable balance of power with no trust and high stakes. Offensive, 
imposition and short reveal the willingness to control and conclude quickly concerning a precise and restricted 
object in order to limit the risks.  
The second one is based on trust in a problem solving or project building approach with a willingness to adapt to 
your counterpart with possible extensions of the negotiation object in a long process leading or not the debates 
depending on the nature of the arguments.  
Much of the situations in which the participants were involved were more complex than the ones described 
above. Therefore most of the choices were difficult ones in dynamic situations where the strategic choices had to 
evolve depending on the results. 
The following table displays the most important dilemmas in terms of choices.   
Table 7. Strategic orientation combinations in the experimentation situation 
Level of Power Level of Trust Stakes / Interests Best Strategy? 
Low High High 
Cooperation / Offensive-Defensive? / 
Short-Long? / Adaptation / Restricted 
 
High High Low 
Cooperation / Offensive / Long / 
Imposition-Adaptation? / Open 
 
Low  Low High 
Cooperation-Competition? / Defensive / 
Short / Adaptation / Restricted 
 
High Low High 
Competition / Offensive- Defensive? / 
Short? / Imposition / Restricted 
 
 
 
When the level of trust is low it is probably better to display a willingness to compete. But it surely depends also 
on the level of power and even makes it more complicated if we consider stakes at the same time. 
A low level of trust together with a high level of power leads to a necessity to dominate and force people to 
quickly accept your options, impose your choices in a very offensive way with small latitude. But if the interests or 
stakes are high isn’t it better to try to cooperate and be defensive while controlling the process? 
Is being defensive compatible with cooperation? In order to collaborate, participants must display in an offensive 
way some information that should help strengthen or increase trust.  
If adaptation is the correct answer to a situation with high trust and low stakes, a high level of power might lead 
to a willingness to impose some rules.  
Eventually the capacity to expand and extend the object of negotiation changes the balance of power and reveals 
new stakes and interests as long as trust already exists. 
 Table 6. Obvious strategic combinations 
1 Competition Offensive  Short Imposition Limited 
2 Cooperation Offensive / Defensive Long Adaptation Open 
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3. Concluding Remarks 
We tried in our study to show that fixing a strategy in negotiation not only depends from the object, the nature of 
the existing conflict or even the participants but mainly from some more influential factors that are usually 
considered as “driving” forces. As each negotiation situation is a new one, a contingency approach cannot be 
satisfactory in order to find the proper ways and means enabling to reach and fulfill one’s objectives. 
There are various possible mistakes regarding strategy in negotiation. Expectations, objectives, the level of 
interdependency and the unpredictable dimension of the outcome together with all the contingent variables can lead 
negotiators to the definition of a wrong strategy. More than this, any strategy will reveal its effect during the 
interaction and will ask for a quick adaptation or a counter strategy if not appropriate. In order to fix the ways and 
means that negotiators can use, understanding which ones are the most fundamental elements can be helpful but 
these elements are also dynamic and evolve during the process. A complete diagnosis over these elements is 
necessary in order to prepare.  
But while any strategy can be considered trough the usual driving forces like power, trust or interests, their 
evaluation and the possible combinations of these elements make the strategic decisions difficult. Not only they are 
difficult and rich concepts but also can be appreciated in many different ways depending on each participant 
perception. Understanding how negotiators position themselves before negotiating and which criteria are helpful 
seems essential bearing in mind that the dynamics of the interaction create new positions all along the process. After 
all the finality of any negotiation is to equilibrate power and create trust in order to integrate both participants’ 
interests in a common agreement. The appreciation of the driving forces before negotiating is essential but a 
capacity to adapt the strategy around the evolution of these elements might also be the key to success. 
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